From: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
To: Albert Esteve <aesteve@redhat.com>,
Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Gaignard <benjamin.gaignard@collabora.com>,
Brian Starkey <Brian.Starkey@arm.com>,
John Stultz <jstultz@google.com>,
"T.J. Mercier" <tjmercier@google.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org,
linaro-mm-sig@lists.linaro.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, mripard@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] dma-buf: add DMA_BUF_IOCTL_DERIVE for reduced-permission aliases
Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 14:28:02 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7b662fcd-3bcd-40a2-b014-d9ce36f6425b@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260521-dmabuf-limit-access-v1-0-26c01e27365a@redhat.com>
On 5/21/26 11:10, Albert Esteve wrote:
> When sharing a dma-buf between components of different trust levels, the
> allocator may need to hand a consumer a read-only view of a buffer it
> holds with read-write access. An example is a camera pipeline where the
> capture component writes frames into a buffer and needs to pass a
> read-only handle to a downstream processing component that should not be
> able to modify the data.
>
> However, no such mechanism exists today. The access mode of a dma-buf
> file descriptor is fixed at export time, and the standard POSIX
> interfaces for duplicating or changing file descriptors (i.e., dup(2),
> dup3(2), and fcntl(F_SETFL)) cannot alter the read/write access mode of
> the copy.
>
> One natural candidate would be reopening via /proc/self/fd/<N> with
> O_RDONLY, which works for regular files. For dma-buf this would fail
> (that is, if we were to add a new handler for open f_op) with ENXIO
> because the dmabuf pseudo-filesystem carries SB_NOUSER, which prevents
> the VFS from opening its files through path-based resolution from
> userspace.
OH MY GOD! This is the like the sixth time I had to clarify that in the last few weeks, I'm really wondering where that is suddenly coming from.
Creating the DMA-buf with O_RDONLY does *NOT* make the DMA-buf itself read only!
That's a really common misconception. The flag only controls if mmap() can be done read/write or read-only to handle cache coherency issues.
It is still perfectly possible for a device to write into a DMA-buf created with O_RDONLY with DMA!
So long story short there is not such feature as a read only DMA-buf, and putting read-only pages into a DMA-buf and then expecting that nobody can write to them is an absolutely clear No-Go.
If we would want to implement a read-only DMA-buf feature we would need to go over all the different DMA-buf importers in the kernel and add security checks.
Regards,
Christian.
>
> Alternatively, exporting the buffer twice would produce two independent
> dma_buf instances, which breaks fence synchronization.
>
> Therefore we add a new DMA_BUF_IOCTL_DERIVE ioctl, which produces a new
> file descriptor for an existing dma-buf with a caller-specified subset
> of the original permissions:
>
> ```
> struct dma_buf_derive { __u32 flags; __s32 fd; };
>
> struct dma_buf_derive req = { .flags = O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC };
> ioctl(rw_fd, DMA_BUF_IOCTL_DERIVE, &req);
> /* req.fd is now a read-only alias of the same buffer */
> ```
>
> Permission escalation is rejected with -EACCES. The new fd aliases the
> same struct dma_buf as the original, same dma_resv, same exporter ops,
> same underlying memory; so importers attaching to either fd see the same
> fence timeline and operate on the same object. Access control for which
> components may receive or pass on restricted descriptors can be layered on
> top via SELinux file:read and file:write permissions.
>
> A shared writable mapping (PROT_WRITE | MAP_SHARED) on the read-only fd is
> rejected with -EACCES in dma_buf_mmap_internal().
>
> Two small internal adjustments accompany the ioctl:
> - __dma_buf_list_del() is moved to dma_buf_release() so it fires exactly
> once on dentry destruction rather than on every file close.
> - dma_buf_file_release() is updated to call dma_buf_put() only for
> files that are not the primary dma-buf file.
>
> This may not be the best approach, but after considering different
> options and alternatives (as described above), we decided to raise the
> discussion upstream. Thus, we welcome any alternative proposal or ideas.
>
> The series is structured as:
> - Patch 1 adds the new ioctl implementation.
> - Patch 2 adds selftests covering the new ioctl.
>
> Signed-off-by: Albert Esteve <aesteve@redhat.com>
> ---
> Albert Esteve (2):
> dma-buf: add DMA_BUF_IOCTL_DERIVE for reduced-permission aliases
> selftests: dma-buf: add DERIVE ioctl tests
>
> drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c | 58 ++++++++++-
> include/uapi/linux/dma-buf.h | 28 +++++
> tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps/dmabuf-heap.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++-
> 3 files changed, 198 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> ---
> base-commit: ab5fce87a778cb780a05984a2ca448f2b41aafbf
> change-id: 20260520-dmabuf-limit-access-73261353841a
>
> Best regards,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-21 12:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-21 9:10 [PATCH 0/2] dma-buf: add DMA_BUF_IOCTL_DERIVE for reduced-permission aliases Albert Esteve
2026-05-21 9:10 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Albert Esteve
2026-05-21 12:30 ` Christian König
2026-05-25 10:27 ` Claude review: " Claude Code Review Bot
2026-05-21 9:10 ` [PATCH 2/2] selftests: dma-buf: add DERIVE ioctl tests Albert Esteve
2026-05-25 10:27 ` Claude review: " Claude Code Review Bot
2026-05-21 12:28 ` Christian König [this message]
2026-05-21 13:01 ` [PATCH 0/2] dma-buf: add DMA_BUF_IOCTL_DERIVE for reduced-permission aliases Albert Esteve
2026-05-21 13:14 ` Christian König
2026-05-25 10:27 ` Claude review: " Claude Code Review Bot
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